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Media and Islamism
in Post-New Order Indonesta:
The Case of Sabili
Abstraksi: Iatuhnya rejim Soeharto pada Mei 1998 menjadi awal dari
perubahan penting di hampir semua aspek dalam kehidupan bangsa Indo-
nesia. Salah satu perubahan itu adalah tampilnya kelompok-kelompok keaga-
maan Muslim yang mengedepankan satu corak pemikiran dan praktik keaga-
maan Islamisme-bahwa Islam tidak hanya untuk kehidupan manusia de-
ngan Tuhan tapi juga mengatur kehidupan sosial-politik dan kenegaraan.
Kelompok Muslim Islamis ini, juga disebut MusLim radikal, menjadikan
alam keterbukaan dan kebebasan pasca Mei 1998, era reformasi, sebagai
arena untuk menunjukkan jati diri mereka.
Pada tingkat institusi, sejak era reformasi telah berdiri oftnas-oftnas
Islam antara lain Hizbuttafuir, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Laskar Jihad
(LJ), Ikhwanul Muslimin QM), dan Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).
Sebagai kelompok Islamis, ofinas-ofinas ini mengusung tema penegakan
syari'ah Islam dalam kehidupan publik Indonesia, anti-Barat, dan karena-
nya percaya sepenuhnya bahwa Islam merupakan jawaban terhadap se-
mua persoalan yang berkembang di Indonesia, yang telah dilanda krisis
ekonomi berkepanjangan. Di samping orrnas-offnas Islam di atas, mun'
culnya gerakan Islamis ini juga ditandai tumbuhnya seiulmah media cetak
yang menyebarka pemikiran Islam bercorak Islamis. Dan salah satu ma-
jalah berhaulan Isamis terlemuka di Indonesia masa reformasi ini adalah
rnajalahSabili.
Artikel ini menghadirkan kajian tentang maialaft Sabili. Majalah tersebut
sebenamya terbit pertama pada 1980-an, tapi hanya satu edisi karena alas-
an p o litik r epr e s i f O r de B aru. S etel ah terb it kemb aI i p ada 1 9 9 3 dan b erl ang-
usng hingga tahun 2000, juga dengan alasan yang tidakjauh berbeda. Ter-
bit sebagai majalah Islamis oleh kelompok gerakan keagamaan berbasis
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kampus (tarbiyah), majalah sabili jelas secara ideologis bertentangan de-
ngan pemerintah Orde Baru Indonesia. Majalah ini dilhat sebagai wujud
gerakan Islam dan karenanya dicatat sebagai anti ideologi negara pancasi-
la. Baru pada era reformasi sejak 1998, Sabili kembali terbit dengan ijn
resmi dari negara.
B er s am a an d en g a n itu, m an aj em en maj al ah j ug a b erub ah. S aat p ertam a
kali muncul, sabili berada di bawah satu institusi Kelompom Teraah dan
Amaliah Islami (KTA), satu kelompok tarbiyah berbasis di [Jniversitas In-
donesia (uI). Lembaga penerbit ini pada era reformasi beralih menjadi p.T.
Bina Media sabili. Ini menunjukkan bahwasabili megalami pembahan se-
cara manajamen, meski mercka yang duduk pada jajaran redaksi rekatif
sama. sejak itulah, Sabili ferus berkembang dan diterima secara luas oleh
pub lik Mus lim Indone s ia. D ib anding maj alah-maj alah lain, sabiri termasuk
yang terdepan dengan jumlah cetak mencapai rata-rata di atas 80.000 eksem-
plar pada tahm 2000-an ini.
Aspek utama berikutnya yang menjadi fokus perhatian artiker ini adarah
unsur-unsur Islamis dalamSabili. Dan, memangsabili jelas dirancang dalam
kerangka ideologi keagaman Islamis. Hal ini bisa dilihat misalnya dari jajar-
an redaksi, di mana sebagian besar mereka berasal dari kelompok keaga-
maan kampus (tarbiyah) yang memang telah lama mengedepankan agen-
da-genda Islamis. Di samping itu, mereka berafiliasi dengan orrnas-ortnas
Islam berhaluan sentpa, seperti Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK), pelajar
Islam Islam Indonesia (PII), Pesantren Hidayatullah, dan LIpIA, satu lem-
baga pendidikan bahasa Arab yang berafiIiasi Quga didanai) pemerintahan
Arab saudi. Begitu pula hal yang sama bisa dilihat dari jajaran penulis atau
kontributor, di manaSabili lebih banyak mengundang mereka yang menge-
dep ankan tema- tem a I sl ami s.
Lebih lanjit, unsur Islamisme juga bisa dilihat secara jelas dari wacana
yang diketengahkan Sabili. Analisa atas muatan rubrik yan tersedia menun-
jukkan bahwa isu-isu dan agenda-agenda Islamisme merupakan perhatian
utama majalaft Sabili. Isu-isu dan agenda-agenda Islamisme tersebut diru-
muskan antara lain ke dalam dukungan Sabili afaspenerapan syari,ah Is-
lam dalam kehidupan sosial-politik dan kenegaraan Indonesia. Bagi sablli,
penercpan syari'ah merupakan solusi efektif atas permsalahan yang me-
landa Indonesia. Isu lain yang menjadi perhatian sabili adalah sentimen
anti-Barat (baca: Amerika Serika), demokrasi, presiden wanita, dan lain
sebagainya. Pada saat yang sama, Sabili secara tegas menyatakan perang
terahadap kelompok Muslim yang dianggap mendukung Barat, khususnya
mereka yang mengedepankan agenda toleransi dan pluralisme.
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his arlicle examines the Islamist issues presented by the Sabilimag-
azine in post-New Order Indonesia from 1998 to 2004. This study
is mainly inspired by the resurgence of Islamism as a consequence
of political liberalization that resulted from the fall of Soeharto in May
1998. The press freedorn permitted by president Habibie has given Islamic
media such as the Sabili magazine the opportunity to operate relatively
freely, unlike the restrictions faced during the New Order era. Sabili mag-
azine, as the object of this study, has for sometime been a popular Islamic
magazine among Muslim readers in Indonesia.
A study of the resurgence of Islamism in post-Soeharto Indonesia would
not be comprehensive without considering Sabili; this magazine consti-
tutes one of the most prominent Islamist magazines of the post-Soeharto
era. This writing examines the content of the magazine and the current
Islamist issues it presents in dealing with contemporary Indonesian and
international issues. This study further aims to comprehend the character-
istics of Islamism as represented in this magazine.
Islamism in the Post-New Order Era
The demise of President Soeharto after more that three decades in
power was followed by unprecedented political freedom, especially for
Muslim groups who in the past had been severely restricted in the public
sphere.r As a result, Islamism flourished in as Muslims were now able to
freely express and articulate their ideas in the public domain without fear
of reprisals. Furthermore, the emergence of Islamist movements in the
Post-New order era was made possible by what Marty and Appleby call
"the delayed psychological responses" to the authoritarian New Order
political system.2
There were at least four important implications of the fall of the New
Order regime and the freedoms that followed. First is the establishment of
numerous Islamic political parties that adopted Islam as their foundational
basis, thus replacing the Pancasila, Indonesia's state ideology. It should be
noted that between May and October in 1998, 42 parties which could be
classified as 'Islamic' (in the sense that they used Islamic symbols or
Islam as their ideology) were established.3 Two parties, the United Devel-
opment Party (PPP) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB), insisted that Arli-
cle 29 of the 1945 Constitution be amended to reinseft the famous "seven
words" (dengan kewajiban melaksanakan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya
[with the obligation to carry out shari'ah for its adherents]. These words,
tlrey believed, would officially provide shari'ahwith the constitutional sta-
tus witirin the Indonesian national legal system. This proposal to reintro-
duce the clause, which would have required Indonesian Muslims to apply
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shari'ah, has been unsuccessful on three separate occasions, that is at the
annual sessions of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Per-
musyawaratan Rakyat, or MPR) in 2000,2001, and 2002.Inthe2002
annual session, the MPR decided not to amend Article 29 of the 1945
Constitution. However, Islamic parties continue to advocate the formal
application of shari' ah.
Second is the growing demand for the formal implementation of shari'ah
in some regions of Indonesia. Aceh was the first province to demand the
application shari'ah.In fact the application of shari'ah in this region first
became evident when in November 1999 a young man accused of com-
mitting adultery was punished by being whipped one hundred times in
public. Similarly in South Sulawesi, there are increasing demands for the
application of shari'ah. Abdul AzizQahhar Muzakkar, chief of the Prepa-
ration Committee for tire Application of Shari'ah (KPPSI) in South Su-
lawesi, has said that the special autonomy status granted to Aceh, includ-
ing the implementation of shari'ah,has paved the way for other provinces
to secure the same status. Thus, South Sulawesi should also be granted
special autonomy status. Moreover, it has been known that at least twenty
out of twenty-four heads of districts (kotamadya/kabupaten) in that prov-
ince have expressed their willingness to apply shari'ah in their own areas.a
The third is the emergence of Muslim groups considered by many as
radical in their actions or ideology (or both), such as the Lasykar Jihad
(Jihad Troops), Front Pembela Islam (FPI, or Islamic Defenders Front),
Hizbut Tahrir (Party of Liberation), and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
(the Indonesian Mujahidin Council), throughout the country. FPI, for ex-
ample, has in the past carried out radical and violent attacks on disco-
theques, nightclubs, and other places of entertainment in the name of amar
ma'ruf wa nahy munkar (enjoining good and prohibiting evil), in order to
eradicate all sorts of religiously prohibited practices such as gambling, the
consumption of alcohol, and prostitution. In so doing, they see themselves
as the torch-bearers in the application of shari'ah in Indonesia. In their
efforts, they are frequently confronted by other groups ofpeople, includ-
ing Muslirns, who reject their claims and radical ways.5
According to Effendy, the emergence of these organizations was a
response to the socio-religious and political circumstances which evolved
during the period of transition, which in their view did not seem in accord
with Islamic values or Muslim interests. The inability of the state to ad-
rninister effectively and solve pressing problems that concern the lives of
many Muslims (for example, socio-religious conflicts, law enforcement
on gambling and prostitution, and regulation of alcoholic beverages) has
triggered the emergence of these Islamist groups. Similarly, the foreign
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policy of the United States towards the Islamic world, which is often
perceived as uneven-handed, discriminatory, and unjust, especially con-
cerning the Palestinian nation and the invasion oflraq, has also contribut-
ed to their emergence.6
The last consequence of the political transition is the increasing popu-
larity of Islamist magazines, most notably Sabili, which has a considerably
large readership in Indonesia.T This bi-monthly magazine, which was pub-
lished underground during the New Order era, currently publishes more
than 100,000 copies each edition. Sabili used to focus more on da'wah
media, but it now appears to be more concerned with promoting political
Islam, typically from the viewpoint of hardliners. Some of its published
opinions are clearly seen as advocating support for the formal application
of shari'ah. It repeatedly argues in editions that because the Indonesian
national law is man-made and not divine, it can never earn the people's
respect. Sabdr asserts that the answer to Indonesia's legal crisis is to re-
turn to the way of God, tl, at is, a return to the application of sfiari'afr. This
magazine further targets Christians and the West (America), pounding
them with harsh criticism. It is worth noting also that the revival of Sabili
inspired the emergence of other magazines such as Saksi, Tarbawi, (Jmtni,
Annida, and so forth.
Since the main concern of this section is the public sphere and Islamic
Print media in the post-New Order era, I will not provide an in-depth
description of the Islamic militant groups or the development of the imple-
mentation of shari'ah in a regional context as such topics have been elab-
orated on elsewhere and are readily available in numerous other current
works.s The main point to be made here is that in the era of political open-
ness of Indonesia, Islamist groups have found momentum to accelerate
their movements. Moreover, there hds been significant support for Islam-
ism in Indonesian society. If a willingness to implement shari'ah is an
indication of Islamism, the rising trend of Islamism in Indonesia seems to
be strong. In November 2002, the Centre for the Study of Islam and
Society (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta State Islamic University con-
ducted a survey on Indonesian Muslims' attitudes toward Islamism. The
survey discovered that many Indonesian Muslirns appear to be Islamist on
the broadest level, that is, they believe that laws should somehow be basi-
cally in accord with Islam. At the general level of assessment, more than
two-thirds (67 percent) of Indonesian Muslims appear to express support
for an Islamic state. An even larger percentage (71 percent) says specifi-
cally that the government should enforce shari'ahon Indonesian Muslims.
However, when given the more specific choices of Islamic law such as
amputating the hands of thieves and restricting the public role of women,
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suppoft for islamism drops sharply from TlYo to 46Yo. Furthermore, the
suryey found that at the mass support for Islamism in Indonesia is a rural
phenomenon rather than an urban one.e
There have been many analyses provided by intellectuals on the root
causes of the emergence of radical Islamism in Indonesia. Some of them
emphasize the internal factors while others focus on external factorsr0.
The conclusion that could be drawn from their views is that Islamic rad-
icalism in Indonesia is rooted in four major factors: political repression,
poor governance, global awareness, and Arabia.lr However, what is miss-
ing from their discussion is how the process of radicalization occurs in the
public sphere, particularly media. In social movement theory, the media is
regarded as an important means of attracting people to a certain ideology
and motivating them to take political action. The nature of media discourse
influences the construction of collective action frames by social move-
rnents.r2 The wide spread of Islamist ideas through the media could in fact
influence society to accept such ideas. Therefore, any analysis of Islamic
radicalism in contemporary Indonesia should include Islamic media as one
of the impoftant elements.
The Rising Public Sphere and Print Islam
The growth of media - especially Islamic magazines - in the post New
Order era has been the result of press freedoms established by President
B.J. Habibie. The downfall of Soeharto triggered a flurry of policy chang-
es towards the print media. Habibie appointed Lieutenant-General Muham-
mad Yunus Yospiah as Information Minister. He promised a review of
press regulations and legislations, and rescinded an unpopular 1984 minis-
terial regulation (Permenpen 01/1984) under which the Minister could re-
voke a publication's permit (SruPP), as was done so dramatically in the
IuIy 1994 bans. Instead, Yunus Yospiah's Regulation (Permenpen 01/1998)
ruled that publishers would be taken to couft for breaching permit condi-
tions. He announced his intention to streamline the complex procedures
for obtaining a SIUPP, to eliminate opporlunities for corruption.13 As re-
ported by Hill and Sen, within Yunus Yospiah's first six months of office,
nearly 500 new permits had been issued, opening the industry to an un-
precedented level of competition.ra Sablr itself obtained a SIUPP in 1998.
Freed from the constraints of state censorship and propaganda, all
segments of the media community including Islamic media have moved
quickly toward diversity and pluralism. In this context, religious authority
has been fragmented among Muslims who struggle and compete for what
Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatory call "the interpretation of symbols
and control of the institutions".15 What is more apparent in the post Soe-
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harto era is the religious debates between Islamists and liberal Musrims in
the media. Such debates are more rikely the continuation of debates be-
tween what Liddle called scripturalist and subtantialist Muslims in the New
order era. However, the current debates seem to be more intense and
advanced.
The existence of liberal Muslim groups which are mostry represented
in NGo groups is stimulated by international agencies which supported
their programs. The Ford Foundation and rhe asia Foundation (and less
visibly AusAID and a range of other foreign-government agencies; be-
tween them are responsible for most of Indonesia,s booming t tco rndur-
try, including Islamic NGos, and to a considerabre extent setting their
agendas. Most of the Musrim NGos working at the grassroots lever have
a personal or ideological affiliation with Nahdatul Ulana Q.{U). Activists ofMuhammadiyah and similar reformist backgrounds tend to get invorved in
a different type of efforts than the typicar NGo: discussion groups and
other forms of adurt education, charitable work, and 
"oop".uiu"r. Theytend to be less dependent on sponsoring by foreign agencies.ru
Some influential Muslim NGos take pains not to appear too closely
associated with either NU or Muhammadiyah such us Ranima, which fo-
cuses on gender issues, organizes training for girls and young women
mostly but not exclusivery of a pesantren background, arrd att-"mprs to
develop an Islamist feminist discourse, critically engaging with estabrished
views and current teachings that prace women in a subseivient position. A
more recent phenomenon, but not an NGo proper, is the Liberar IslamNetwork (JIL). The network started out as a mailing list and website,
soon adding a radio program, rerayed by l0car stations in a number of
Indonesian cities, and a syndicated newspaper column. Its core members
have deliberately sought a high profile in the rnedia because they feel that
Muslim intellectuals have too long been involved in arcane discussions and
left the production of simple and accessibre texts on rslam for larse audi-
ences to the Islarnists. More than any other group, JIL sees the ltruggle
against narrow and intolerant interpretations of Islam as its chief mission.
unsurprisingly, Islarnists of various stripes soon identified JIL as one of
their own chief enemies.rT It could be seen from the attacks and criticism
of Muslim liberal's view in Isramist media, more pafticurarly in sabiti.
The other advanced action of liberal Muslims in the post New order
era is the creation of the Islamic liberal magazine syir'ah, which was fistpublished by the Desantara Instituter8 in 2001. This monthly magazine is
supported by The Asia Foundation and concentrates on counter-discours-
es of narrow interpretations of Islarn as raised in Islamist magazines. The
issues which are raised in this magazine are almost sirnilar with that raised
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by JIL. However the magazine appears to be "brave" and tried to be simple
in presenting controversial issues such as gay and lesbian rights, Islamic
communism, sexual encounters amongst santris,Islam and local supersti-
tion, and so forth. However, this magazine does not attract as many read-
ers as its Islamist counterpart.re The reason for this decline might be due
to the way they present their views which seem to be vulgar and radical.
Besides, the language used in this media seems to be abstract and sophis-
ticated for comtnon Muslims in Indonesia.
As for the Islamist groups and their media activities, although
there have been many Islamist magazines none of them have seen the
same succes s as Sabili. Besides Sabili, other prominent magazines include:
. Aanida -This magazine was first published in 1991 under the compa-
ny PT.Kimus Bina Tazkia. The magazine, which targets young Mus-
lims, rnostly contains Islamic short stories that stress Islamic ethics
and identity. While the magazineencourages its readers to help Muslim
Palestinians against Zionist Israel, unlike Sabilithis magazine does not
devote its energy to criticizing other religions.
. (Jmmi- The magazine was first published in 1989 and obtained SIUPP
in 1998. Sirnilar to Annida, the publication is owned by PT. Kimus
Bina. The articles in "Ummi" which means "my mother", generally
focus on issues of interest to Muslim mothers. In some instances, it
does voice some criticism of Israel's repression of Muslim Palestin-
ians. Unlike Sabili, however, the magazine is more focused on Muslim
family issues rather than politics and opposition to Christians and Jews.
. Tarbawi - As evident by its name "tarbawf', or "educational", this
magazine is linked to the Tarbiyah movement. Targeting Tatbiyah ac-
tivists (although it is not explicitly stated), the magazine provides reli-
gious education and guidance for Muslim activists for living in the
worldly life. The social activities of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS),
the Islamic party which was established by the tarbiyah activists, are
often promoted in this magazine.
. Saksi - This magazine focuses on national political issues with a strong
emphasis on PKS political views. This magazine displays some similar-
ities to Sabiliinthat it covers the struggle of Muslim leaders in imple-
rnenting Islamic shari'ah in several regions, and promotes the imple-
mentation of Islarnic law as the solution to Indonesia's economic, po-
litical and social problems. In cefiain editions, Saksi presents the face
of American politics which is dominated by conservative Christians.
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The issues raised in such magazines would indicate that they are dom-
inated by the ideology of the Tarbiyah movement. There are various indi-
cations of this. First, the issues and the arguments raised by these maga-
zines are concomitant with the Tarbiyah ideology. Second, many writers
and Muslim figures consulted with have a Tarbiyah/PKS affiliated back-
ground. Lastly, such magazines are closely linked with one another. For
instance, the two magazines i.e. Annidaand Ummi are owned by one com-
pany. Additionally, some editors of Tarbawi magazine namely Ahmad
Zairofr and M. Lili Nur Aulia previously worked for Sabili.
As stated earlier, one indication of the resurgence of Islamic radicalism
in the post Soeharlo era is the proliferation of Islarnist discourses in the
public sphere. These Islamic magazines have a significant readership base
in Indonesia. Agus Muhammad noted that the circulation of Ummi for
example is around 80,000 copies per-edition.2o Ideas presented by this
magazine and those like it may hinder the creation of civil society and civic
pluralism in Indonesia. Although the substantialist Muslims had more op-
portunities than Islarnists in dominating the public sphere in the past, that
appears not to be the case in the post New Order era, as can be seen from
the rising popularity of Isiamist magazines.
Sabili and Islamism
Sabili was first published one year after the 12 September l9B4 Tan-
jung Priok incident.2r It emerged in the context where the expression of
political Islam was suppressed by the Soeharto regirne. in the New Order
era, there were many policies of the government that suppressed the Mus-
lims or contradicted Islamic values.22 The most contentious one is the
application of Pancasila as the sole foundation (asas tunggal) for all polit-
ical parlies and mass organizations. The government's main motive was
to safeguard Pancasila as the state's national ideology, and to continue to
disseminate it amongst society.23 Many Muslirn mass organizations ob-
jected to the governrnent's idea for fear that adopting Pancasila as their
sole basis could mean that Pancasila would replace Islam, or that Pancasi-
la would be made equivalent to religion.2a In the name of safeguarding
Pancasila, the regime arrested Muslim activists, preachers, and Muslim
figures who rejected Pancasila. Moreover, many preachers were controlled
and prohibited from preaching in mosques and even put in jail, accused of
provoking Muslims to oppose the New Order government.z5 The dissatis-
faction of Muslims to the repressive government reached its climax in the
bloody clashes between militant Muslims and the military in Tanjung Pri-
ok. Norlh Jakarla in 1984. This incident left hundreds of Muslims dead or
injured.26
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Several years before the Tanjung Priok incident, a group of young
Muslims tried to look for the ideal format of an Islamic movement. zainal
Muttaqin, a student of university of Indonesia (UI) and part of the first
generation of Tarbiyah movement members at uI, with his colleagues es-
tabl is hed a study club cal led KT Ar (Ke lomp ok T er aah dan Am aliah I s I am I
[the Islamic Analysis and Conduct Group]. They used a new type of Is-
lamic da'wah by basing their activities on what they believed to be a true
and comprehensive understanding of Islam.27
In carrying out their da'wah activities, they found it necessary to find
a medium through which they could provide a wider understanding of
Islam and shape Muslim thinking.zs practically speaking, their idea was
mainly spurred by the fact that many Muslim activists coming from secu-
lar universities, notably the students of uI, could not access Islamic liter-
ature in their own language because most was written in Arabic. Further-
more, they sought to use the media initially to provide spiritual education
through articles and translations. In materializing the idea, they published a
bi-monthly magazine c alled " S ab i I ?' .2e
The name of Sabili which means ,,my way,, is inspired from one word
in verse 108 of Surah Yusuf.3. The verse reflects their spirit to create an
ideal da'wah movement.3r According to Rahmat Abdullah, the first general
chairman of sabili, the verse deals with several important points, most
importantly the harakah or da'wah movement, which is neither a silent
da'wahnor a da'wah activated by mass, but a kind of da'wahthat revives
the masses.32
The establishment of sabili in the 1980's was risky considering the
fact that the Soeharto regime, supporled by the military was very repres-
sive of any Islamic and leftist movements. Furthermore, for most of the
New order, the rnedia appeared to be under the command of the govern-
ment, controlled through the censorship process and increasingly through
ownership.33 In such a context, it is easy to understand why there were
almost no newspapers and magazines which explicitly raised criticism of
the New order regime. what is more, all newspapers and magazines were
required to obtain a SIUPP from the Ministry of Information whicn was
very difhcult to get at that time since it went only to individuals or compa-
nies with close connections to the political establishment especially the
Golkar Party.3a Neveftheless, zainalMuttaqin and his corleagues published
sablr without a SIUPP. For Muttaqin, the publication of sabili was partly
a form of protest to the political system which did not accommodate the
rights of people to express their ideas and inspirations.35
The first edition of sabili was published under the institution of KTAI.
The general chairman was Rahmat Abdullah36 while the editor in chief was
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by Zainal Muttaqin. The cover of the magazine was coloured with purple,
illustrated with the word Allah in Arabic calligraphy on it without putting a
date, month, year and address. The editorial introduction in the first edi-
tion states that the motivation for publishin g Sabili at that time was the fact
that there was no media that could present an 'authentic' and 'compre-
hensive' picture of Islam, educate Muslims with Godly (Rabbanl ideas
and thought and guide them to the hansf way of life.37 It appeared that
media atthat time was dominated by 'secular' Muslim figures38 who re-
jected political Islam and it therefore might be assumed that Sabili was a
response to such a situation. However, it should be noted that the ftrst
edition of Sabili became the last edition due to the lack of finance and
human resources who could seriously handle the media.3e Besides, the
general chairman Rahmat Abdullah was so busy in da'wah activities that
he could not focus on developing the magazine.aO
After disappearing for a few years, Sabili was published again in 1988
under the initiative of Zainal Muttaqin with the permission of Rahmat Ab-
dullah. Muttaqin became the general chairman and editor in chief at the
same time. In the introduction of the first edition, 5-20 Rabi'ul Awal1409
H, tlre editor in chief wrote that the return of Sabili was accompanied by
better preparations. One of them was a more solid work ethic of the staff.
This was reflected in the survival of the magazine, albeit the schedule of
publication (i.e. twice a month) was sometimes broken. It began publish-
ing regularly in the fourth year. As a result, the circulation of Sabilimaga-
zine experienced a significant increase from 2000 copies in the first pub-
lislring to 65,000 copies for the last edition in 1993.4r According to Mutta-
qin, the newly special format of the magazine in the second period (1988-
1993) might have contributed to this increase.
The content of Sabili was divided into three parts: first, issues around
tl,e Muslim world (al-alam al-Islanl. Second, issues related to the heri-
tage of Islam such as tsaqafah Islamiyah (Islamic culture), tatikh (the
history of Islam) and ibroh (lessons). The third was Indonesian issues.
Amongst the issues covered, the Islamic world was the distinctive char-
acteristic of this magazine in the later years of the New Order. According
to Muttaqin, there was no Islamic media that intensively reported the op-
pression of Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, and
Bosnia except Sabili.a2 This might be what rnade it popular among Muslim
activists during the New Order regime since by reading Sabilt Muslirns
who were suppressed by the government could share the same feelings of
their brothers in other parts of the world.
Sabili's popularity and appeal lay in its coverage of da'wah related is-
sues; This syrnbiosis was managed by those who actively engaged in
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da'wah and understood both the area of da'wah and what the Muslims
needed. In other words, Sabll indirectly participated in designing the da'wah
strategy.a3
However, Sabilifaced a serious problem when it presented the letter of
a reader in the 7'h edition of the fifth year of publication (20 November-5
December 1992). The letter revealed the harassment and Christianization
of a veiled Muslim woman by three missionaries. The reader gave details
of how she was brought to a quite place in Rawamangun near IKIP Jakar-
ta campus. In that place, she was forced with a knife to give up all of her
jewellery and to say Christian words. Fortunately, she was able to escape.
The letter was regarded by the Minister of Security L.B. Moerdani and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Restoration of Security and Order Soedomo
as something which could spark the masses and it was for this reason that
the high court of Jakarta called in the editor in chief of Sabilifot clarifica-
tion.a
The editor in chief Zainal Muttaqin decided to reject that call after re-
ceiving information from an acquaintance in the high court that this was
only a strategy to arrest him since many Muslim activists who were called
by the high court were put in jail with the allegation of opposing Pancasila
as the state ideology. Although Sabili continued to be published for some-
time after this, it was decided that after the 1l'h edition (20 January - 5
February, 1993) printing would cease due to the great risk the Islamic
activists faced as targets of the regime.a5
The collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998 and the reforms
that followed paved the way for greater press freedoms in Indonesia. This
resulted in the mushrooming of the media industry, particular Islamic
magazines. In response to this, Sabili retutned to publish in June 1998
under the institution of KTAI, the same institution they used in the New
Order.a6 However, it was only stated in the first and the second edition.
Since the third edition, it has been stated that the publication of Sablr is
under company of P.T. Bina Media Sabili.ai It indicates that KTAI was
transformed into a business company. Since Sabll became a company, it
has become financially stronger than before. To establish a company,
Muttaqin invited sorne Muslim businessmen to invest in Sabili. The ten
investors of Sabili are as follows: Rahmat Ismai| (26%), Thoriq Basalamah
(L}%),Abdul Muthalib (5Yo),Lutfr Amir Tamimi(5%), Aryono Madyanto
(5 Yo), Z ainal Muttaq in (l 0%), F ar id Praw i r ane gar a (l 0%), Dj ufr i Dj am aan
(10%) and Kemas Taufiq Mochtar (9%).ot Rahmat Ismail, who has the
highest investment, was appointed to be the main commissary, Abdul
Muthalib as the general chairman, and Zainal Muttaqin as the editor in
chief.ae Sabili obtained an SIUPP from the Ministry of Information on 30
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July 1998.50 By having an SIUPP, Sabili was better able to cornpete in the
open market. However, in an attempt to reach even greater heights in the
market, Sabili staff held a work meeting on 10-11 July 1998.51 In the
meeting, Rahmat Ismail stated his wish that Sabilimagazine would one day
be read by Muslim preachers in villages before they deliver their Friday
sermon. The target audience would be the mosque youth, members of
religious study groups in school (ROHIS), and members of Islamic social
organizations, as well as professionals who wanted to return to Islam- The
target age group would be readers aged between 16 and 40 years old,
those who have graduated from senior high school and are middle income
earners.52 According to Muttaqin, this decision was made in order to catch
a niche market, and once the magazine was better established, it was en-
visaged, Sabll would focus on other markets.53
In the meeting, it was also decided that Sabiliwould be "the media for
all," for any Muslim without consideration for their political affiliation,
religious schooling, and organization. In this regard, Sabili was expected
to be a uniting bridge for the various Muslim groups in Indonesia. Accord-
ing to Salman, the Director of Sabili, the media ideally should not affiliate
or side with a cefiain political parly since it would limit their market. Har-
ian Abadi, the media of Masyumi Par1y, is a good example of this since
because of its narrow focus it was not able to survive in the New Order
era.5a
Furthermore , Sabili was intended to describe the universality and the
completeness of Islam. Therefore, the policy of news of Sabili stems from
four principles: ishlah (reform), ukhuwah (brotherhood), tasamuh (toler-
ance), and rahmah (mercy). Sabili, at the same time, is intended to be
assertive in rejecting and fighting against what they perceive as errors
(b atil) and deviances. s'
The return of Sabili was welcomed by Muslim figures who remem-
bered it from before. Their satisfaction was displayed in letters to the
editor. For example, Hussein Umar, a member of the house of representa-
tive, expressed his hope Ihat Sabili could become the main representative
for Muslims in facing the Western media that discriminates Islam.56 Mu-
tamminul Uia, the former chairman of PB-PII, also provided positive com-
ments about Sabili, expressing his belief that Sabll could provide the best
for Muslims, by writing rational and true news, and voicing the aspirations
of Muslims.s? Amin Rais, the locomotive of reformation in Indonesia, hoped
that Sabili could become a professional magazine which would work for
the betterment of the utntnalt, analytical and clever at presenting informa-
tion, and brave in voicing the truth whatever the risk'58 Similariy, Arif
Rahman, an expert in education, hoped Ihat Sabili could cover issues of
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pertinence to Muslims.5e A. Mansyur Surnegara, a historian, suggested
that Sabili should be the voice of the weak and oppressed people.60
Presented with the same format and logo as in the previous publica-
tion, the circulation of sabili has increased gradually from over the years
to more than 100,000 copies in 2000. For Muttaqin, this fact shows that
the presence of Sabili was not only welcomed by certain Muslim groups
but also by Indonesian Muslims at large.6r
However, critical comments were also directed at the magazine, re-
vealing its weaknesses. Deliar Noer, the general chairman of the Islamic
Ummah Parry (PUf for instance, criticized the news about the joining of
PUI with ten parties in forming a forum of communication of total pro-
reformation parties while in fact it did not. He stated that sabili did not
check the truth of such news.62 Other criticism was made by AMJ putra,
the editor in chief of 'Link' magazine of UI. After reading four Sabili
magazines, he concludedthat Sabili is emotional, inflammatory and con-
demning, neither fair nor clever in its opinion, lacking of a journalistic
touch, and presenting an Islamic understanding which is hard and ,strange,
for common people.63 Atmakusumah Astraatmaja, the chair of the press
Council (Dewan Pers) even labelled Sabili as pamphlet media since its
writing style and report presentation are not in line with professional press
and j ournalistic standards.6a
In spite of the weaknesses of Sabili, it could not be denied that Sabili
was a pioneer of Islamist media in the reformation era. Its return in June
1998 was followed by the proliferation of Islamist magazines such as
Ummi, Annida, Saksi, Tarbawi, Al lzzah, Darul Islam, Salafy, percikan
Iman, Hayatul Iman, Gena Islam, EL-Fata, and IsLamia. These magazines
emerged and obtained an SIUPP during the years 1998-2004.I1might be
assumed that there wili emerge other Islamist magazines in the years to
come. The emergence of such magazines may be motivated by the popu-
larity of Sabiliinthe public sphere.
Vision and Mission
The vision of Sabili is to become a professional and innovative maga-
zine for the da'wah movement by presenting an accurate and comprehen-
sive picture of Islam, to tighten ukhuwah (Muslim brotherhood), and to
become a hub for thsse in the field of da'wahwho have potential in jour-
nalism.65 The mission of Sabili is as follows:66
1) To carry out comprehensive, authentic, undeviating, continuous, edu-
cating, and empowered da'wah.
2) To present Islamic thought that is comprehensive and covers all as-
pects of life (syamilah mutakamilah).
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3) To become a medium that protects Muslims frorn the 'war of thought'
(ghazwul fikrl and tightens the brotherhood of Muslims.
4) To place itself as the sustainer of the da'wah movement.
5) To become a means ofjournalistic development for those involved in
da'wah.
Given the mission and vision of Sabiliabove, it appears that Sablr holds
views which are generally voiced by Islamists namely that authentic Islam
is drawn from the main sources of Islam, that is, the Qur'an and the
Hadith, as well as the example of the salaf as-saaleft (the pious predeces-
sors, reference to the earliest generations of Muslims). For Islamists, any
thought and interpretation which is not in accord with both religious texts
would be regarded as deviation and thus would not be accepted. Accord-
ing to Roy, the Islamists generally adopt salafi theology: they demand a
return to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the shari'ah and reject tradition,
philosophy and Islamic mysticism (tasawwut).67 In this respect, critical
Islamic heritage is not respected by Islamists. This view has been repre-
sented by rnany writings in Sabili. There is less discussion dealing with
philosophy and tasawwuf However, if they are available, the writers are
more likely to suggest the readers to be alert in dealing and practicing them
since some practices of tasawwuf are contradictory with the Qur'an.68
Therefore, it is not surprising that Sabili in its editions often criticizes
certain Islarric schools or Liberal Islamic thought, which they see have as
being deviant.
The second element that Sabili stresses in its vision and mission is the
comprehensiveness of Islam. In this regards, Sablr sees Islam as a com-
plete and universal system (kdffah) and accordingly, Islarn is not seen as
merely reiigion, but as a political ideology that guides all aspects of social
life (politics, law, economy, social justice, foreign policy and so forth).
Building on this basic view, Sabili demands that the Islamic state, formal
shari'ah and economic shari'ah should be applied as the solution for prob-
lems faced by Indonesia. As a consequence of this view, Sabili criticizes
any concepts coming from the West such as capitalism, secularism, ma-
terialism, socialism, pluralism, gender, and so on.
The formulation of the vision and mission of Sabili could not be sepa-
rated from the socio-political conditions of Indonesia in the New Order
era. Sabili emerged in the political context where political Islam was sup-
pressed by the New Order regime while cultural Islam as presented by
'secular Muslim intellectuals' was suppoded. The founder of Sabili,Zainal
Muttaqin, asserted that 'secular' Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish
Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid dominated the media, especially Ternpo
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and Kompas in the 1970's and 19B0's, as if there were no other islamic
perspectives except what they wrote. For him, Islamic views presented
by such Muslim figures have deviated from the true Islam and there opin-
ions tend to secularize Indonesian Muslims.6e Therefore, the emergence of
Sabiliinthe 1980s is partly a response to such a situation aiming to present
Islamic teachings which they perceived as being more authentic and com-
prehensive.
Themes
The themes covered in Sabili in the post New Order era are much
different with those covered during the New Order days. One of the rea-
sons Sabdl was able to continue its operations without any restrictions
from the government during the New Order era is that it focused on inter-
national issues namely alam Islami (the Muslim world), education and
da'wah while national politics received scant attention. In the post-New
Order era, however, Indonesian contemporary politics has become the
central theme for Sabili although the coverage of major international issues
is not neglected.To
The stories contained in each edition of Sabrlr is generally divided amongst
three main topics: national issues, international issues and Islamic heritage.
Tlris format follows that which was formulatedby Zainal Muttaqin during
the New Order days. However, there is a clear difference; as mentioned
above national issues have certainly dominated the magazine in the post-
New Order days.
The magazine's critical and provocative style is not only evident in the
headlines and titles, but also in the way the editors present the coverage.
The words which are used appear to be clear, unsophisticated, sharp, and
somewhat biased. That is to say that sometimes Sabili seems to present
the full criticisms and opinions of the Islamists but neglects the voices of
the other side. At first glance, Sabrlr seems to cover-both-sides, however,
if one analyzes the coverage, it will certainly appear unfair and unbal-
anced. The example of this could be seen in the editorial of the Counter
Legal Draft of the Compilation of Islamic Law (CLD-KHI) issue. In its
coverage of this issue, Sabrlr covers many negative reactions from MUI,
ulama, and Islamist groups against the draft while few clarifications and
opinions from the liberal Muslims are included.
Editors
The editorial staff at Sabiliis composed of mainly young Muslims who
have a great da'waft spirit. The educational background of the editors
varies (See Table I below). Most of them, including the former editor in
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chief, come from secular universities such as University of Indonesia,
UGM, IPB, and Trisakti Universify, while few come from Islamic colleges
such as the Islamic and Arabic studies institute (LIPIA). This is due to the
fact that Islamist students generally come from secular universities. In
terms of political affiliation, the editors vote for Islamic parlies i.e. PPP,
PAN, PBB, and PKS. However, according to Salman, most of them vote
for PKS.7' Before working in Sabili, many of them have engage din da'wah
activities in Islamist organizations or Islamic study clubs such as the Tar-
biyah mov ement, PII, PERSIS, and Islamic m edia (Hidayatullah, Darmasena,
and Salam).It could be said that they were experienced in da'wah activi-
ties before workins in Sabili.1z
Table l:
Educational and Organizational Backgrounds of the Editors
No. Editor Education Islamist Organization
Zainal Muttaqinzr University of Indonesia
(UD, LIPIA (not finished)
Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII,1.
Tarbiyah Movement
z M.U. Salman TINISBA PII, Lembaga Da'wah
Kampus(LDK)
3 Rivai Hutapea Gajah Mada University
(UGM)
LDK
tl Herri Nurdi Pesantren Hidayatullah Pesrntren Hidayatullah
5 Nurcholis Ridwan LIPIA PERSIS Bangil, LIPIA
6 Hepi Andi LIPIA LIPIA
The background of editors seems to have contributed to their radical
views on Islam. Nurcholis Ridwan, for instance graduated from the PER-
SIS Pesantren in Bangil, East Java. After completing his senior high school,
lre taught Islamic studies for two years in Darul Istiqamahin Makassar.
Darul Istiqamai is perceived by many as a hard line pesantren which often
receives financial aid from Islamic foundations in Saudi Arabia. He then
continued his graduate studies in LIPIA in Jakarta. LIPIA, which is fully
funded by the Saudi Government, has been maintaining Wahhabi Salafism
in teaching.Ta Most of the lecturers of this college graduated from the
Middle East. While studying in LIPIA, Ridwan parlicipated in a selection
test for Sabiliin 2001 and Dassed.Ts
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Salman studied in the journalistic deparlment of the Faculty of Com-
munications at I-INISBA. He actively engaged in campus da'wah activities
during his undergraduate studies' Fufthermore' he was able to experience
working as a journalis tin harmonismagazine' Salamlslamic magazine and
the Indonesian Journalist Union (PWD in Bandung' In 1998' he was invit-
edbyhisseniorfriendZainalMuttaqintobeeditorinSabili.T6Since200l,
he has been the editor in chief replacing Muttaqin'
Rivai Hutapea graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of
Gajah Mada Yogyakarta (1996)' There he was involved in Campus Dak-
wah Movement (LDK) u"iiuiti"t during his studies' After he graduated' he
worked as a Journali ,iin Du'-u'ena Islamic Magazine' amagazine which
belongs to the Indonesian military (ABRI)' Through this' he got acquaint-
ed with Za\nalMuttaqin who wasalso ajournalist' In 1998' He was invited
by Muttaqin to help him in developing Sabili'In Sabili' he has been work-
ing us u reporter and editor' Recently he became the coordinator of report-
ers.77
HerryNurdistandsoutasbeingquitedifferenttoailoftheotheredi-
tors at Sabili. Although he only graduated from senior high school' life
experiencehadtaughthimalotandwasblessedtohavebeenheavily
involvedinthemediaforsometime.Hehadwrittenseveralarticlesin
Jakarla Post and Republika before coming to Sabili in 1999'?8
Writers
Thewriterswhocontributetheirafticlesinsabiliareoftenlslamist
intellectuals and Muslim figures. Their views are in line with Sabll's, which
seekstopromotetheimplementationofshari'ahinlndonesia.Manywrit-
ersbelongtocertainlslamistgroupsandlslamistpartiesinlndonesia.
Arnong the writers and Muslim figures consulted by Sabili are:
. Dr. Daud Rasyid, who is currently a lecturer of IAIN Sunan Gu-
nungJatiBandung.Heisawell-knownMuslimintellectualwhopro-
motestheimplementationofshari,ahandlrasbeenaconsistentcritic
of liberal Muslims' In the 1990s, he actively wrote articles in Media
DakwahagainsttherenewalideasofNurclrolishMadjid.?9Intheyears
following the fall of Soehafio, he has been a regular writer for Sabili'
. Al Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab is the leader of the Islamic
Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam' or FPI)' FPI was founded by
habaib(IndonesiansofArabdescent),Islarnicteachersandscholars
on the 53'd Indonesian Independence Day' August 11 1998 in Jakarta'
Theestablishmentofthisorganizationwasmotivatedbythespiritto
eradicate immorality (ma'siyat), and in striving to do so FPI has at-
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tacked a number of bars, karaoke clubs, and pubs in Jakarta. The
distinctive feature of FPI, which distinguishes itself from other Islam-
ist groups, is its.destructive actions inmaterializing its aims. The major
aim of FPI was to promote Islamic shari'ah in the corridor of Indone-
sian nation.so
. Irfan S. Awwas is the chainnan of the Executive Board of Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMD which was iaunched in yogyakarta in Au-
gust 2000. The head (amir) of the organization is Abu Bakar Ba,asyir,
one of the founders of the Ngruki pesantren in surakarta. The main
agenda of MMI is to implement shari'ah in Indonesia. In contrast to
FPI which has at times resorted to violence in achieving its aims, MMI
has chosen the political approach to promote its agenda. For example,
MMI members advocate the implementation of shari'ahby encourag-
ing discussion through public debates, the mass media, through writ-
ings on the internet and by pubiishing books.sl
. Adian Husaini, who was the General Secretary of Komite Indonesia
untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam IKISDI],82 or the Indonesian committee
for solidarify with the Islamic world, is one of Indonesia,s most prolif-
ic writers on the subject of the implementation of shari,ah in Indone-
sia. The other issues he often raises in his writings and seminars are
criticism of uS foreign policy and liberal Muslim ideas. He is now
taking his PhD in the University of Islamic Thought and civilization
(ISTAC) Malaysia.s3
o Hartono Ahmad Jaizhas since 1998 been the chairman of lajnah
ilmiyyah (research division) of the Institute of Islamic Research and
Studies (Lernbaga Penelitian dan pengkajian Islarn-Lppl), an Islamist
organization. Jaizis a well-known writer who often criticizes .deviant,
Islamic groups and liberal Muslims in Indonesia. Among the books he
has written include: "Deviant Islamic schools and thinking in Indone-
sia" (2000), "The Danger of The Jaringan Islam Liberat (JIL) and Fikih
Lintas Agama (FLA)" (2002), "There is Apostasy (petnurtadan) in IAIN,'(2005).
. Ismail Yusanto is the Spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
Hizbut Tahrir is an international Islamic group which was founded by
Taqiyuddin Al-Nabhani in early 1952inal-euds, palestine. HT entered
Indonesia in the 1980s. The main goal of this organization is to estab-
lish Khilafah Islantiyah since nationalism is seen as fanaticism
(ashabiyyah) and contradictory with the objectives of Islam.sa In Indo-
nesia, one of the most well-known slogans used by this organization is,
"Save Indonesia with shari'ah!" HTI's defining characteristic is its non-
cooperative attitude with the government.
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Hussein Umar is the General Secretary of Dewan Dakwah Islam
Indonesia (DDII). DDII is a Jakarta-based national organization, found-
ed in 1961. It's membership is dominated by religious teachers and
officials (ulama and zuama). DDII sends Islamic preachers (da'fi to
remote parts of Indonesia, helps to build mosques, and publishes Me-
dia Da'wah, a magazine notorious for its attacks on liberal Muslims
and the Christians during the New Order period. It is among the most
extreme or militant groups tolerated by the government.85
Anwar Hasan is the General Secretary of Komite Persiapan Penera-
pan Syariat Islam (KPPSI), or the Committee for the Preparation of the
Implementation of Shari'ah. KPPSI was established during the first
South Sulawesi Muslim congress in October 2001. This committee
aims to implement shari'ah in South Sulawesi through regional parlia-
ment. KPPSI's struggle has received significant support frorn the leg-
islative body, regional government, Muslim figures and community in
South Sulawesi.86
Abu Deedat Shihabuddin is the Chairman of Forum Anti Kristenisa-
si dan Pemurtadan (FAKTA), or Anti-Christianization and Apostacy
Forum. As implied by its name, FAKTA is an institution which focuses
on researching and reporting activities of Christianizationin Indonesia.
There is a special section in Sabili - Bimbingan Tauhid - which is espe-
cially for this institution to discuss and denounce Christian doctrines in
order to warn Muslims from the danger of any kind of Christianization
in Indonesia.
Given the background of some the writers, it could be said that Sabiliis a
platform for the Islarnists to express their views and ideas. However, it should
be noted that not all writers or Muslim figures presented in Sabili could be
described as Islamist, but are rather consulted because of their knowledge of
a particular issue. For instance, Azyumardi Azr4 a leading moderate Muslim
intellectual, once wtote an afiicle on Islam and political issues in Sabill. He is
also often interviewed by Sabll conceming national political issues. Similarly,
national political observers such as Bahtiar Effendi, Eep Saefullah Fatah, and
Imam Prasojo are also sometimes consulted. In criticizing American politics,
Sabll sometimes consults with the Indonesian Board of Intelligence and intel-
ligence observers. Since political issues and da'wahare dominant in Sabili,the
figures presented are dominated by political obselers, activists, politicians,
and Musiim figures of da'wah. In tetms of Islamic discourse, moderate per-
sonalities such as Quraish Shihab, Ali Yafie, and Komaruddin Hidayat are
hardly interviewed or consulted, and this is certainly because their religious
views are not in line with Sablls views.
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Readers
In the New Order era, Sabili's readership was limited to mosque youth,
da'wah activists in Islamic organizations, and members of religious study
clubs in campuses and schools. The magazine was only circulated among
such readers and it was not widely available in the market place. However,
after its return in 1998, it has been sold and circulated.8T The results of the
AC Nielsenst survey below illustrate the cross-segment of Sabili reader-
shin in 2002-2003:
Table 2:
The readership survey of AC Nielsen 2002-2003
b.
Sex ofthe readers:
- Men
- Women
Ages:
- 15 - 34 years
- 35 
- 
39 years
- 39 + years
Economic Status:
- Class A and B
- Class Cl
- Class C2
- Class DE
Profession:
- OfficialEmployeelProfessional:
: (57%)
: @3%)
: (87%)
: (5%)
: (8%)
(s6%)
(2r%)
(re%)
(4%)
(33%)
(22%)
(s%)
(24%)
(r4%)
(3%)
(30%)
(2s%)
(34%)
(50%)
(r1%)
(7%)
(6%)
(r6%)
(4%)
(4%)
(r%)
(1%)
(r%)
f.
- Student
- Housewife
- Low Employee
- Retired
- 
Fnfrenranerrr
Education Level:
- Senior High Scholl
- Junior High School
- College/Academy
Regions of Circulation:
- Jakarta and BOTABEK8e
- West Java
- Central Java
- East Java
- Sumatera
- Kalimantan
- Sulawesi
- Bali, Southeast Nusa
- Maluku, Irian Jaya (Papua)
- Abroad and others
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The survey shows that while Sabiliis read by various groups of people
in terms of sex, age, economic status, profession, education and so on,
Sabili is more popular among young Muslim professionals and students.
Their most common Sabili reader is between 15 to 34 years old, well off
and has at least a senior high school or university education. By contrast,
the lower income groups aged 35 and above are less likely to read Sabili.
Furthermore, the readers mostly come from big cities and areas such as
Jakafta, Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi (50% of readers) and Sumatra (16%).
It is also evident from the survey that the target market of Sabll has
been expanded from students and Muslim activists to professionals. Nev-
eftheless, the survey does not reveal the affiliations (Islamic organization
and Islamic school) of the readers. It might, however, be assumed that the
readers of Sabili arc indeed affiliated in some way to Islamist organizations
or religious study clubs since the background of Sabili's readers in terms
of age, occupation, and education are in line with that of Islamist groups in
Indonesia. Islarnist groups such as the Tarbiyah Movement or Hizbut Tahrir
for example are followed by urban young Muslims with a higher level of
education and income.eo This is also supporled by the fact that the per-
centage of Sabili readers in Java and out of Java is quite low. In East Java
for example, readership was only 6 %o of the total and this is due to the fact
that this region is a Nahdatul Uiama (NU) dominated area. For Central
Java, noted Muttaqin, Sabiliis more popular in ex-Masyumi or santtibased
coastal regions (daerah pantwa) such as Semarang, Tegal, Demak, and
Kudus.
The Popularity of Sabili
The success of print media depends on circulation and advertisement.
In the Indonesian context, amagazine would survive if its circulation could
reaclr around 30,000 copies for each edition.et Although Syir'ahmagazine
sells only around 5,000 to 10,000 copies of each edition it is financially
kept afloat through support from foreign foundations. Different to other
existing magazines, Sabili mainly depends on its sales while adverlisement
only fill about 10 to20Yo of its pages. In 1993, Sabili's circulationreached
around 60,000 copies per-edition. In the post-New Order era, Sabili has
been selling around 70,000 to 80,000 copies on a constant basis. The
magazine experienced a spike in sales in 1999 to 2000 during the religious
conflict in Ambon. According to Uki, the head of circulation and distribu-
tion, Sabili's circulation was more than 100,000 copies per edition at that
time. More than 150,000 copies of Sabili's special edition Sejarah Emas
Muslim Indonesia(The Golden History of Indonesian Muslim) was circu-
lated in 2003. This edition was parlicularly popular among the pesantren
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community since they found it provided a considerably refreshing per-
spective on the history of Indonesian Muslim heroes as compared to otherliterature they read in schoor. Many commented that they wourd be use the
sabili special edition as a source of reference in history lessons in theirpesantrens.ez The survey carried out by AC Niersen gives us a betteridea ofthe readership numbers and how sabll stacks up against the rest(See Tables 3 and 4 below).
The Readership survey lii:ffi, magazines 2000-200r
Greater Iakarta, Age l5+, No. of Readers (.000)
441
436
390 390
3 360
359
l. Gadis
2. Sabili
3. Femina
4. Kartini
5. Aneka
6. Misteri
7. Intisari
8. Bobo
9. Gatra
10. Ligaltalia
324
291
277
261
259
Table 4:
The Readership Survey of leading magazines 200l_2002
No.Magazine 2001
1. Misteri 6852. Aneka 4653. Sabili 258
4. Bobo 365
5. Gadis 3l l
6. Femina 406
7. Karvanku 289
8. Ligaltalia 273
9. Kartini 448
10. Tempo 270
TOTAL 6937
o/o Growth
28.3%
3.0%
84.syo
21.6%
13.7%
-24.1%
3.5%
3.s%
-33.7%
-2.2%
-4Yo
2002
879
479
476
444
354
308
299
299
297
264
6684
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The first survey shows the readership numbers of the ten leading mag-
azines in Indonesia during 2000-2001. The magazine with the highest read-
ership is Gadis with 441,000 readers. Sabiliis ranked second with 436,000
readers. It is interesting.to note that Sabili is the only Islamic magazine
presented in the list, coming in ahead of such leading magazines as Femi-
na, Kaftini, Gatra and TemPo.
The second survey shows the growth of readership of the ten leading
magazines from 2001 to 2002. As can be seen from the table, Misteri is
ranked in the first position with 689,000 readers in 2001 and 879,000 read-
ers in2002, representing a growth in readership ofjust under 30%. Sabili,
which was previously ranked second (in 2000-2001), fell to third position
with 258,000 readers in 2001 and 476.000 in2002. However, In terms of
the growth of readership, Sabili experienced an84.5%o growth in sales'
How can one explain the success of Sabili? The success of Sabili might
be generated by the reforms it instituted and the content of the magazine
itself. After being repressed by the New Order regime, Muslims sought to
find Islamic rnedia which voiced their aspirations and promoted their Islam;
ic identity. Sabili ceftainly rneets these criteria. Moreover, the provocative
issues contained in Sabili attract many Muslims to read it. The issue of
shari'ah, criticism of the West, reports on the Christianization movement,
and critics of the govemment are among the more popular issues presented
by Sabili on a regular basis. According to the coordinator of reporters Rivai
Hutapea, the fresh perspective taken by the magazine also contributes to its
success. He exemplified this by referring to the religious conflict in Ambon
in 1999 and 2000. While many within the rnedia community were reluctant
to repoft the religious conflict in Ambon, Sabili acted differently by reporting
on the developments from day to day in detail by advocating Muslims as the
victims of the Christian groups. The result was increased readership of
more than 100,000 copies during this period.e3
Apart from the themes of the magazine and perspective taken by the
reporters, the management and strategy should also be taken into account
in attempting to determine the reasons for Sabili's success. Sabilihas de-
veloped considerably in terms of quality over the years as a response to
the suggestions and the tastes ofthe readers. The result can be seen in the
improvement of the quality of the pages, colour and themes covered. Al-
though the irnprovements have affected a price rise of the magazine, it has
by no means meant significant drop in sales. The circulation of sabili has
remained stable at around 80,000 to 100,000 copies per edition. The other
feature of this magazine lies in the pricing policy which - different to
many other magazines 
- 
does not differentiate between Java Island and
non Java. Most magazines charge an extra one thousand rupiahs for sales
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outside of Java.ea What's more, the distributors directly deliver the maga-
zines to the agents ofcerlain cities in Java in order to tighten the relation-
ship the magazine has with the agents. The agents and distributors often
discuss the magazine in an attempt to pin point areas in which it might be
improved.e5
Islamist Views in Sabili
This section aims to discuss and analyze the views propagated by Sabili-
views which can be generally categorized as Islamist 
- 
from 1998 to
2004. This can be done by examining the various themes of the magazine
such as Sekitar Kila (Around Us), lbrolr (Lesson), Telaah Utama (Main
Coverage), Telaah Khusus (Special Coverage), Indonesia Kifa (Our Indo-
nesia), Kolom (Column), Tarqilyah (Religious Advice), Alam Islami (Is-
lamic World), Interview and Bimbingan Tauhid (Tauhid Guidance). It is
worth noting that this magazine is dominated by news of a political nature
covering issues both in Indonesia and abroad from an Islamic perspective.
As an Islamicmagazine, one therefore often finds Islamic arguments within
political coverage. The views and arguments that will be presented and
analyzed in this section are those which are regularly presented in this
magazine from one edition to another.
There are three primary themes that dominate Sabili articles, namely a
shari'ah orientation, criticism of Christians and Jews, and condemnation
of America. These three themes have coloured the articles of Sabili since
I 998.
Shafi'ah
If we look at various afticles and reporls in Sabili, it is evident that the
writers and editors of the magazine are of the opinion that Islam is the one
and only solution for humans in this world since God has provided a com-
prehensive guide for all mankind in the form of the Qur'an and Hadith.
They generally insist that shari'ahshould be followed and implemented as
commanded in the religious texts since God's law abrogates human law.
Due to its idealizati on of shari'ah, Sabili calls on its readers to support the
implementationof shari'afi. Furthermore, by relying on the Qur'an and the
Hadith as the standard of truth, Sabili has a tendency to criticize Muslim
ideas and practices which appear to contradictthe shari'ah. In line with
the general views of other Islamist groups, Sabili identiftes shati'ah as
Islamic law derived from rules stipulated in the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
Sabili's Islamist tendencies are evident from the views which are regularly
reinforced by the magazine through the arlicles presented. These views
include:
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a) Islamic Law as the Solution
In Sabili, it is often emphasized that Islam 
- 
through shari'ah - should
play a significant role in contemporary Muslim life. Daud Rasyid, for ex-
ample, argues that shari'ah is the most just law since it was revealed by
God. Rasyid further points out that past experience with Indonesia's legal
system has shown that it has brought nothing less than brutality, a lack of
justice, and corruption. All of this, he says, has left Muslims with a desire
to see sftari'afi irnplemented throughout Indonesia.e6 This opinion is shared
by Agung Pribadi, who suggests that the failure of communism and cap-
italism in the world should pave the way for Islamic law to be introduced
in Indonesia. This for him is fair because Islam is the majority religion in
Indonesia, and he assures non-Muslims that they do not need to worry
because shari'ah protects their rights accordingly.eT
In backing their claims and the promotion of shari'ah, the writers
sometimes refer to scientific researches and surveys. Topo Santoso, for
example, argues that the implementation of Islamic criminal law in Saudi
Arabia minimized the frequency of crime. He refers to Freda Adler, the
professor of criminology in the USA, who includes Saudi Arabia as one of
the top ten countries with the lowest crime-rates in the world. This opinion
is also shared by Sam Souryal who stated that during the past ten years,
the crime rate in Saudi Arabia is lower than Muslim countries which do
not apply Islamic law.es Similar arguments were maintained by Habibullah
inthe ibroh section of Sabili. He speculated that the increase in crime in
Indonesia is rnainly due to the use of secular law and the only solution to
tlris problem is the implementation of shari'ah for it creates safety and
establishes justice in society. He supported his argument by referring to
the International criminology census in 1986 stating that the crime rate of
a day in Canada equals l2 years in Saudi Arabia.ee
it is interesting to note that in attempting to show the effectiveness of
shari'ah in minimizing crime, the writers only took Saudi Arabia as a mod-
el while they overlooked other Islarnic countries which also apply shari'ah
to some degree, such as Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan and Malaysia.
What's more, there is a strong tendency to view the urgency of imple-
menting shari'ah in terms of its positive impact on crime rather than its
overall impact on public good. In this light it should be noted that accord-
ing to Freedom House, Saudi Arabia is ranked amongst the worst coun-
tries in the world in terms of the protection of civil rights, illiteracy, and
participation of women in the public sphere.loo This fact should be an-
swered by Islamists who always refer to Saudi Arabia as the ideal country
when it comes to the implementation of shari'ah.
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In attempting to implement shari'ahin Indonesia, two discourses havebeen broachedby sabili. The first is the estabrishment of an Isramic state(daulah kramilyah) in order to pave a formar way for Indonesian Musrimsto implement shari'ah. The second is a return to the Jakart a charter (pia_gam Jakarta) by the insertion of seven words (i.e. .,...with the obrigationof the adherents of Islam to carry out shari'ah,,) in the constitution. How-ever, as can be observed inthemagazine's articles, the later discourse ismore dominant than the former. only a few arlicres stress the idea of thecreation of an Islamic state in Indonesia.
The writers who favour the idea of an Isramic state argue that there isno alternative way to fulfil Muslim aspirations in IndonesiJexcept by mak_ing Indonesia an Islamic state. By 
"rtublirhing an Islamic state, they as-sert, not only will old national problems be solved, but also the cha,engesof future can be anticipated, and it would mark the beginning of a newstate and nation (utrunah) in the world.r0r
According to Salman, there have not been any serious and systematicefforts made by Muslims to create an Islarnic state in Indonesia fbr tworeasons' First, the lack of a proper understanding of Israrn within society,and second, a residual fear of an Islamic rebellion as initiated in the past byMuslim figures like Karlosuwiryo and Daud Beureuh. The i.fr"rrion rrru,emerges now is that if Muslims seize power to establish an Islarnic state,discrimination and oppression towards the non-Muslim minority will oc-cur' For Salman, this is an erroneous perception. Throughout Isiamic his-tory we can see numerous examples of how non-Muslim communitiesliving under Islamic Iaw have beln treated justiy, such as the Jews andchristians of Madinah during the time of the piophet; at peopre weretreated equally before the law regardless oftheir religion.roz '
The struggle for the implementation of shari,ahconstitutionally is aprevalent issue in sab,i, As an example, issues on the insertion of theJakarta charter were raised in 1999, zooo una 2002 inwhich the dis_course on the amendment of the constitution became the agenda of dis_cussion in the House of Representatives. Similar to previoJs urgrn'"nr,for an Islamic state, the writers contend that the revivar of the Jakarlacharter is a possible avenue for upholding Islamic law in Indonesia.103
salnran believes that essentialry the notion Jf amending the rg4'constitu_tion (by inserling the above-mentioned seven words) should be seen as thesolution to solving the problerns of this country. wrrire many sorutions interms of the economy, politics, and society have been offered by expefts,he stressed' none have succeeded compretely in sorving Indonesia,s prob-lems- Therefore, he says, "why not try an Islamic solution?...as Muslimswe absolutely believe that Islam is the solution.,,10a
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In a Sabili report, K.H. Firdaus points out that after the removal of the
Jakarta Charter, disasters struck the country. In other words, if Islamic
Law was implemented at least for Muslims, the situation of this country
would be more peaceful and prosperous.t05 Similarly,Zainal Muttaqin be-
lieves that the inclusion of the seven words would promote justice be-
cause one of the objectives of shari'ah is to create justice. He further
claims that it would have numerous positive impacts on society. Most
importantly, first, shari'ah will become a moral guide for Muslims and
particularly the government, and second, shari'ah will force Muslim offi-
cials to uphold justice. This, he argues, will resolve what he views to be
the country's biggest issue, that is, the degradation of morality of the
politic elite.r06
In establishing their arguments for the reinstatement of the Jakarta
Charter, Sabili writers not only refer to Muslim activists and intellectuals
but also to the experts of politics and law as well as political observers
who favour the reformation of the 1945 Constitution. Harun al-Rasyid and
Moch. Machfudz give five reasons as to why the 1945 Constitution should
be changed. The first reason given is that the 1945 Constitution was only
meant to be a temporary constitution, and it should thus be changed as
Soekamo once declared. Second, based on the historical experience of
Indonesia under the regime of Soekarno and Soehatlo,Ihe 1945 constitu-
tion has never created real democracy but rather a form of authoritarian-
ism. Third, the 1945 Constitution contains rules which give the leaders too
much power. Four, the Constitution gives too much authority to the pres-
ident making it easier to be corrupt. As Mahfudz pointed out, "Soeharto
made so many rules for his business because he had the authority." Final-
ly, the 1945 constitution is too honest to the character of man, whereas it
should limit the power and authority of those in power when they abuse
it.t07 Although Rasyid and Mahfudz do not provide an Islamic perspective
in showing the weaknesses of the 1945 Constitution, their critical argu-
ments are imbued with an Islamist perspective in that they direct the read-
ers to the idea of an Islamic constitution (the Jakarta Charler) as an alter-
native to the constitution.
Using a historical approach, the Sabili writers also argue that Islamic
law is plausible to be implemented in Indonesia since it was the first law
widely applied by Islamic kingdoms in the area in the past, and those
kingdoms that lived by Islamic law experienced peace and prosperity.
However, since the coming of the Dutch colonialists with their Christian
mission, the role of Islamic law was eliminated from society.ros
Apart from the historical experience of Indonesia, sorne writers refer
to Madinah as the model for the Indonesian Constitution. There are two
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reasons why the reformation of the constitution should draw on Madinah
as an example. First, Islam is the religion of a majority of Indonesian
citizens and this situation resembles that of the society in Madinah in the
Prophet's days. Second, Islamic values were able to bring justice to the
various components of the society without discrimination in terms of reli-
gion, blood, or tribe. It was successfully implemented by the Prophet and
the Caliphs when ruling the city.t0e It is noteworthy that the reference to
Madinah as a model society is not only held by Islamists but also progres-
sive Muslims. Nurcholish Madjid, for example, regards Madinah as
masyarakat madani, a term which for him is equivalent to the Westem
concept of 'civil society'. He emphasizes that in Madinah, social contracts
between the citizens of different tribes and religions were honoured and
this is typical of modern society.lro He equated the Pancasila with the
Madinah Charter due to its accommodation of all religions in Indonesia.
This indicates that there is a huge gap in the way in which Islamists and
progressive Muslims viewing the Medinan society.
From the description above, it is evident that Sabili's argument for the
implementation of shari'ah in Indonesia is based mainly on four factors
namely theological, demographic, historical, and socio-political. The first
factor emphasizes the fact that Islam is a religion which offers guidance
and solutions to of life's difficulties (economic, socio-cultural, political,
and so forth). In this respect, shari'ah is seen as obligatory for Muslims to
apply. The second factor points to the fact that the majority of Indone-
sians are Muslirns. Adherents of Islam constitute 87 percent of the coun-
try's population.rtr In Sabili, this fact alone should become socio-cultural
and politicai legitimacy for the formal implementation of shari'ah. The
third factor refers to the experience of Madinah in the era of the Prophet in
implementing Islarnic law, as well as the experiences of the Islamic king-
doms throughout Indonesian history. It is believed that the implementation
of shari'ah in the past was effective in ruling the society. The last factor
refers to the fact that secular-positive law has not brought about econom-
ic, social-cultural, and political improvements for Muslims in Indonesia.
Based on this, Sabll views shari'ah as the solution for Indonesia's multidi-
mensional crisis.
b) It is hanm (prohibited) for a woman to become a president
of the country
The issue of a woman president was presente d by Sabili on three sep-
arate occasions: First in late 1998 when it became known that Megawati
would be nominated as a presidential candidate as for the 1999 general
elections; second at the time of President Abdurrahman Wahid impeach-
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ment in 2001; and finally in 2004 at the time of the general elections. In
this regards, sabili drew on religious texts as the basis for its rejection of
having a woman (Megawati) as president. The prohibition of a woman
becoming president is mainly based on the Qur'an and Hadith. God says
"man is the leader for woman" (al-Baqarah: 34). Furthermore, a famous
Hadith states that "A country which renders its leadership to a woman will
never succeed" (Hadith transmitted by Bukhari, Tinnidzi, and Nasa,i).
Another Hadith states "no great disaster (fitnah) comes after me except
woman" (Hadith from UsamahbinZaid,transmitted by Bukhari and Mus-
lim). The prohibition of women becoming leaders has also been agreed
upon by the scholars (ima), including Abu Hanifah, Malik, Syafi,i, Ah-
mad bin Hanbal, and Ibn Taimiyyah.r'2
Another argument commonly used against perrnitting a woman to be-
come President is the historical experience of the prophets and the Ca-
liphs. History tells us that God never delegated a woman as a prophet and
leader in this world since the Prophet Adam up to the prophet Muham-
mad. What's more, during the days of the Prophet, the Caliphate, Daulah
Bani Umayyah, Bani Abbas, the Islamic kingdom in Spain, as well as the
Ottoman Empire, not a single woman ever became a leader or Caliph.t'3
According to Rizieq and Salman, the prohibition against woman be-
coming president is not gender discrimination as feminist groups often
argue. Islam does not discriminate against women, they argue, but rather
recognises that they have different roles to play in society. Hence, the
reaction of some Muslims in rejecting a woman president is not discrimi-
native but obedience to Allah. 
"a
More clearly, Salman states that women by nature have limits in some
respects which logically prevent them from carrying out ceftain duties as
effectively as lnen, or at all. The limits here are related to fitrah, their
nature and their psychology in that women menstruate, bear children, and
so for1h. In essence, men and women are equal but not the same, meaning
their roles, rights and obligations also differ.lr5 This argument is echoed by
Irfan S. Awwas. verse 34 of Surat an-NisG in his view clearly indicates
that the right to lead or rule the state is only for a man. He regarded that
this is not discrimination but something proscribed by reiigion."6
Furthermore, Salman assefis that the state under a woman president
would invite nothing but disasters and problems. This, he argues, was
none the more evident than during the presidency of Megawati when rnany
crises beset Indonesia. In this respect, he used Megawati's failed govern-
ment in Indonesia and proof of the above-mentioned Hadith.
Sabili's view is justified by the nature of women who are physically
weaker than men and face such biological barriers as menstruation, and
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giving bir1h. Muslim women, it appears, have a set role in life, that is, they
are encouraged to focus on household duties such as raising the children.
Such a view has been presented on numerous occasions in Sabili articles.
c ) Polygamy is a part of shari'ah
Polygamy has been a debatable issue among Muslim intellectuals in
Indonesia for some time. Liberal Muslims, particularly Muslim feminists,
tend to see polygamy as a cultural phenomenon rather than parl of Islam.
For them polygamy as practiced by the Prophet should be seen as social
transformation towards justice in the Arabic milieu. Accordingly, the es-
sence of polygamy which is limited to four wives is actually aimed to
minimize its practices since it dehumanizes women. Therefore, they claim
polygarny is a form of discrimination. On the contrary, Sabili tends to
defend polygamy as a part of Islam as it is clearly stated in the Qur'an (an-
Nisct: 3). Sabiliwriters stress that justice is the major prerequisite of po-
lygamy. The meaning of justice here is fulfilling the rights of women in
that all of the wives receive the same amount of money, love, attention,
and so on. Daud Rasyid, however, argues that justice here means 'materi-
ally' only because it is impossible for a husband to fairly share his feelings
with all his wives. He refers to the example of the Prophet who was in-
clined to love Aishah more than his other wives.rrT
Moreover, they refer to the Prophet's model of polygamy which is
based on akhlak karlmah. His polygamy was not based on manly desires
but a wish to overcome social problems at that time. The Prophet's polyg-
amy benefited his wives, their families as well as their clan through mar-
riages. Theref,ore, the Prophet's polygamy did not discriminate against
women.lls
Drawing on historical examples, writers at Sabili argue that polygamy
is not something odd since in the past, most of the Prophets engaged in
polygamy. In Indonesia, many kings in Java, Minang, and Betawi were
also polygarnous. Sociologically, they argue that polygamy is necessary
since the female population outnumbers the maie population. According to
their data, the percentage of women in Indonesia is 68 %o while that of
men is only 32 o%. In US, the number of women is higher eight fold than
men. Research in Kenya reveals thatl6 0/o women tended to see polygamy
as positive. The women regarded polygamy as sociologicaily beneficial if
the wives help each other.rre In strengthening their argument, the writers
also present interviews with polygamous wives such as the first wife of
Hamzah Haz, the former vice president and wives of Puspo Wardoyo,
who pioneered the program of polygamy awards in 2003.120
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d) Islamic Economy as the alternative
The failure of the economic system in Indonesia encourages the Islam-
ists to turn to the Islamic economic system as an alternative. Indonesia's
economic woes have been made much worse by its dependence on the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which has doubled its debt. Arlicles in
Sabili have more than once presented the view that Indonesia's depen-
dence on IMF assistance could be overcome if the country were to imple-
ment a shari'ah economic system.r2r
The historical experience under Soekarno and Soeharlo reveals that
the secular economic concept has failed to make this country prosperous
and rich. Therefore, Salman contends, Muslims should implement an eco-
nomic system which is based on justice, humanity and provable results;
that is the system that was irnplemented by the Prophet and the Caliphs
after him. This system, unlike the capitalist system, does not exploit hu-
mans, because from an Islamic view, wealth and power belong to Allah
and they are only entrusted to humans. Referring to the view of Yusuf al-
Qardawi, the writer suggests that in any economic activities the doer must
understand that Allah is the true owner of this universe. Thus, production
is in fact exploring the materials created by God to adjust them to human
needs. By such a philosophy, humans are expected to be responsible in
utilizing economic sources. r22
The writers in Sabili argue that the economic system in Indonesia relies
heavily on ribd (interest), while God forbids Muslim to take or give riba.t23
According to Antonio Syafi'i, the economic and monetary crisis which
beleaguered Indonesia in particular and Asian countries in general in the
late Nineties was a result of the use of riba- Sabll strongly supports the
Maj elis Ularna Indonesia' s (MUI) fatwa that banking interes I is har&m and
therefore encourages Muslims to save their money ina shari'a.h bank which
they perceive as being free from ribapractices.t2a
Sabili writers argue that Muslims wish for an economic system based
on shari'ah principles which could be implemented in Islamic business.
Syaf i argues that Islam is rich with economic and business alternatives
through fiqh muamalah (Islamic laws on [business] transactions) such as:
syirkah(partnership), amanah(trust), ijarah(hire), wakalah(agency), kafdlah
(surety), rahn (debt), qard (guarcntee), musaru'a.h (share-cropping), ajr
(salary), and so forth.r25
An interesting perspective offered by Zaim Saidi, the director of PI-
RAC, is that the shari'ahbanking system in Indonesia is not really Islamic
enough since they have only Islamized the capitalist banking systemr26
What has to be developed is an Islamic economic system, namely in real
trade. Therefore he offers a notion to use gold and silver coins (dirham
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and dinar) as an alternative to paper money. There are several reasons for
this: first, a similar system was practiced in the days of the Prophet be-
cause the coins possess an intrinsic value. Second, if gold and silver can
apply as money then they will be universal currency for all countries.
Third, as a universal currency, it does not have problems with a rate of
exclrange. Thus, one dinarin America is equal to one dinarin Indonesia.
As a result, the rate of exchange will not be dominated by any country or
currency, namely the US dollar. Foufth, using the dinar and dirham means
that transactions are carried fairly since in the transaction one exchanges
his dinarfor other wealth that has the same value. If the dirham and dinar
system can be applied, Muslims will not depend on the dollar and other
currencies, thus contributing to the survival of an Islamic economy.r2T
It is of interest to point out, however, that the dirham and dinar system
was not the invention of the Prophet since this system was previously
used in the Roman ages, long before the bifih of Muhammad.
e) Against the perceived deviants of shari'ah
In the name of guarding shari'ah, Sabilihas heavily criticized and even
labelled as "sesat" (deviant) those Islamic groups or ideas which diverge
from shari'ah or authentic Islam. Among the writers, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz
seems the most active who thrives on revealing the "mistakes" and "devi-
ances" of Muslim figures or Islamic groups. Those who have received
criticism from Sabili are Ahmadiyah,Lia Aminuddin (the founder of the
Salamullah religion), NII KW IX Azzaytun and liberal Muslim figures es-
pecially those who form part of the Liberal Islarn Network (JIL).r'?8 Here I
will only focus on Sabili's criticism of liberal Muslims.
Ulil Abshar Abdallah, the coordinator of JIL, wrote a controversial
arlicle in Kompas, November, 11 2002 entitled "Menyegarkan Kembali
Pemahaman Islam" (Freshening Up Our Understanding of Islam). This
article has sparked the anger of radical Muslim groups including Sabili.
For Sabili, Ulil's ideas not only contradict the shari'ah as presented in the
Qur'an and Hadith, but also insult Allah and the Prophet.r2e In his afticle,
Ulil does not acknowledge the existence of the law of God as well as
shai'ah mu'amalah (interaction between human beings). He claims that
the commandments of wearing the veil (for women), cutting off the hand
ofthe thief, flogging and stoning (for adultery), and so forth are no longer
applicable since they were merely the expression of Arabic culture. Even
the prohibition against marriage between Muslim and non-Muslirns is seen
as not relevant any more because the verse against it is not clear. Further-
rnore, he asserts that the Qur'an is just half of the source of guidance for
Muslim, with the other half being the human experience.rr0
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In response to Ulil, Sabili seems to support Forum Ulama Ummat Indo-
nesia (FUUI) headed by Athian Ali, who has called for the death of Ulil.
Sabili even questions the seriousness of police to process Ulil's case. For
Sabili, police shouid investigate who stands behind Ulil, his funding, and
what political motive lies beliind his efforts.t3l
Similarly, Irfan S. Awwas criticizes Ulil's ideas by relating a story of
his tirne studying. He stated that Ulil studied in LIPIA between 1988-1989
and although he was a smart student he could not finish one important
subject, that is Tauhld. As a result, he did not pass and he moved to STF
Drikarya and then became a student of Romo Frans Magniz Suseno. From
the story, Irfan speculates Ulil's understanding of Tauhldis far from clear
or correct.l32
Ulil and his colleagues in JIL regard the demands of militant Muslims to
implement shari'ah as counterproductive because of the complexity be-
tween the private and pubiic sphere. For them, religion is a private matter,
and "a secular state is more promising than an Islamic state as dreamed by
the fundamentalists, since it includes both the energies of piety and sins
(ma'siyyat) at the same time".r33 For Husaini, such an idea is misleading
because shari'ahcannot exist ifreligion and state are separated. He argues
that the implementation of shari'ah is a right of Muslims that cannot be
overlooked. He emphasizes that Isiam appreciates pluralism and inclusiv-
ism and this Muslim demand is a democratic one.r3a
According to Rizieq, liberal Islam draws on reason and logic not true
religion, just as the deviant group the Mu'tazilah have done. To al-Anshari,
for the case of cutting off of a hand, for example, JIL's argument against
this Islarnic regulation is weak because they do not rely on dalil syar'i
(proof from the Qur'an and Sunnah). Hence, JIL simply seeks to interpret
Islamic teachings based on its own desires and beliefs.t35 JIL's ideas are
unfounded because any arguments they use do not refer to religious texts
or classical Muslim scholars in the past. Their arguments are erroneous
because they do not understand Islam. For the case of cutting off of the
hand of a thief, Husaini argues tl,at all ulama 
- 
both past and present 
-
have agreed that it is an Islamic regulation which cannot be removed from
Islamic law.136 Husaini views the secular movement as an attempt to sub-
jugate Muslims. Ifthe state irnplemented Islamic law and Islamic econom-
ics, the West would be worried because Muslims would no longer depend
any more on their products.t3T
Another controversial issue raised by liberal Muslims is the making of
a counter legal draft of the Compilation of Islamic law (CLD-KHI) by the
team of gender mainstreaming at the Department of Religious Affairs,
headed by Dr. Musda Muiia. This draft focuses on the protection of four
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values: gender, pluralism, human rights and democracy.r38 One Sabilihead-
line, "Deviant thought occupies the Department of Religious Affairs (DE-
PAG)", demonstrates the magazine's obvious rejection of the draft. This
article is just one of many that attack the Department and the draft. For
Sabili, many articles in the draft contradict shari,ah, among them as foi-
low:r3e
. Maruiage is conducted under the principles of willingness, equality,
justice, public good (kemaslahatan), pluralism and democracy.
. A husband and a wife can make a deal to be married for a ceftain
period of time.
o A woman is allowed to marry by her volition if she is 21 years old even
without her parents and wali.
e Marriage between different religions is allowed.
. The foundation of marriage is monogamy.
o The minimum age of men and women for marriage is 19 years old.
. The Iddah(period in which a divorcee must wait before marrying again
applies to both husband and wife.
o Poftion of inheritance (warisan) between son and daughter is equal.
Athian Ali comments that GLD-KHI is not a compilation of Islamic law
but the compilation of "satanic iaw". It is impossible for hirn to calr it
islamic law because it only relies on gender, democracy, pluralism and
human rights without reference to the Qur'an and Sunnah.raO
Many Muslim figures referred to by Sabili tend to suspect that there
are political motives behind the emergence of the draft. Hussein for in-
stance suspects that the political motive of cLD-KHI is to hinder the im-
plementation of shari'ah in Indonesia. In the same tone, Amin Djamalud-
din contends that there is a hidden power that uses Muslim youth with the
goal of clouding the understanding of young Muslims, namely with re-
gards to the Qur'an and Hadith. These allegations were strengthened by
the fact that the Asia Foundation, a leading US NGO, supporled liberal
Muslims in completing CLD-KHI. t+ t
The spirit to fight against Islamic liberalism and secularisrn brought sabrll
to cover state-run Islarnic institutes (IAIN), especially UIN syarif Hidayat-
ullah Jakarla which is viewed by many as the nest of liberal-secular think-
ing, in two editions. The leading titles are apparently intended to discredit
IAIN; 'Selamatkan IAIN dari liberalisme dan Amoral" (Save IAIN from
Liberalisrn and Immorality), "Mau Kemana IAIN" (Quo Vadis IAIN),
"IAIN:Ingkar Allah IngkarNabi?(IAIN: Defying Allah and Defying the proph-
et?), "Melacak Jejak Liberal di IAIN" (Tracing Liberalisrn in IAIN).
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sabll describes IAIN as an educational institution in which strange and
un-Islamic ideas are developed. By studying at IAIN, students are expect-
ed to have good akhlak and morals, to think critically and analyticalry to
solve problem as well as to have a future vision.ra2 However. sabilihas
noted how "erazy" thinking has afflicted the Jakarla campus. One of the
more controversial issues to have arisen in recent times is the demand for
the freedom not to wear jilbab, as raised by FORMACI (Ciputat Study
Forum). sabili claims that controversial thought is actually not new to
IAIN. In 1970s, such a mode of thinking was initially developed by Harun
Nasution, the former rector of IAIN Jakarla, who is also famous for his
freedom of thought. He encouraged freedom of thought among the aca-
demics of IAIN. This freedom was encouraged by Nurcholish Majid (welr-
known as Cak Nur) also. Cak Nur for instance raised the slogan ,,Islam
Yes, Islamic Pafiy No!" The trend of such thinking has been continued by
students now in IAIN especially by student organizations and study clubs
such as PMII, HMI, IMM, Formaci, Piramida Circle, Makar, ISAC and so
for1h. They have contributed to the liberalism in IAIN due to their commit-
ment to study controversial ideologies such as Marxism, perenniaiism.
Secularism, and Rationalism. From them emerged various terms such as
Liberal Islam and Modern Islam.ra3
In commenting on liberalism at IAIN, Daud Rasyid asserts that free-
dom of thought and rationale cannot be used to interpret things that are
clear in Islam. The push for freedom of thought at IAIN is simply a mis-
understanding of Islam; Islam does not forbid people from using their
brains, but thinking should always be in-line with the principles of the
Qur'an and Sunnah, as well as the understandings of true Islamic schol-
ars. From here then one is free to analyze any problem without deviat-
ing.t*
In Sabili'sview, the liberalism developed at IAIN tends to have a neg-
ative impact on the morality of IAIN students because they do not hold
religious values. They show this tendency by revealing the fact that men
and women hold hands freely on this campus without feeling ashamed.
What is more, the culture of free sex can be easily found in IAIN. They
support this argurnent by presenting the information they got from the
society near IAIN campus telling them that many IAIN students were
caught having sex and many students had abortions. This phenomenon is
not exclusive to IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta but also IAIN Sunan
Kalijaga Yogyakarta and IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya.ra5
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2) Criticism of the Christians and Jews
Criticism of and attacks on Christians and Jews have been a dominant
theme in Sabilithroughout the period 1998 to 2004. Besides the coverage
found in such sections as Telaah Utama, Telaah Khusus, Alam Islami, and
Indonesia Kita, Sabili has a special section named "Bimbingan Tauhid'
(Tauhid Guidance) which contains criticism of Christian doctrines. This
section is often written by FAKTA.
It is worth noting that news or coverage either of politics, economics,
or conflict is often related in some way to Christians and Jews. In Sabili,
they are perceived and described as the great enemy who desire to destroy
Islam. In the international context, America is perceived as a Christian
state and Israel as a Jewish state who collaborate in attacking Muslim
countries such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. In the national context,
Sabili regads Christians as enemies who have been struggling through
politics, economics, and socio-cultural approaches to eliminate Islam and
conveft Muslirns to Christianity. This argument is based both on historical
experience as well as religious texts which attest to their "bad" character.
The famous Qur'anic verse in this regards is verse 120 from Surat al-
Baqarah.
Sabilihas reported many cases of "Christianization" throughout Indo-
nesia, such as in Yogyakarta, West Java, South Sulawesi, Jakarta, West
Sumatra, Nofth Surnatra, Lampung and Aceh. Sabili claims that mission-
aries and Christians working in Indonesia are often free to use any means
to convert others, including through lying and also regularly disregard the
regulations of the Department of Religious Affairs in carrying out their
activities. Some of the more popular tactics employed by Christians in
converting Muslims in Indonesia include:ra6
1. Christianization by marriage - The main objective of this approach is to
corrupt Muslim Women. In order to marry a Muslim woman, the Chris-
tian pretends to conveft to Islam. After marriage, the man then calls his
Muslim wife to convert to Christianity.
2. Christianization by kidnapping Muslim woman, making her pregnant
(rape) and then converting her to Christianity. Another method em-
ployed by Christians is to get a Muslim woman pregnant and then de-
mand that the woman converts to Cluistianity if she wants the man to
take responsibility for the child. An interesting abbreviation raised by
Sabili in warning Muslirn women is, "Beware of the three D's". That
is, dipacari (dating), dihamili (getting pregnant), dimurtadkan (becom-
ing an apostate).
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3. Christianization by providing jobs, courses and scholarships - This
method targets Muslirn men and women who have graduated fromjunior or senior higii school and face difficulties in getting a job or
continuing their studies. The church activists usualiy promise them
jobs or scholarships on the condition they convert to Christianity.
4. christianization through the provision of aid - This method targets the
poor in rural areas. The missionaries act as social workers offering
them aid in the form of food, rice, sugar, instant noodles, medicine,
and free education. After becoming dependent upon the aid, those who
wish to continue receiving aid are required to conved to Christianity.
Sabili has repofted cases of this in Gunung Kidul and Klaten (yogy-
akarta) and in other places.
5. christianizationby pretending to be ulama- The christian activist passes
him or herself off as a former ustadz (religious teacher) or a family
member of a ieading ulamawho has conveded to Christianity. Through
this method, he or she could raise doubts about Islarn amonsst Mus-
lims.
6. Christianization by spreading drugs - Drugs are spread throughout the
Muslim community, typically to Muslim students. After becoming ad-
dicted, they are admitted to rehabilitation centres dominated by Chris-
tians where they are purported to brainwash them and indoctrinate
them with Christianity.
7. Hidden christianization through the establishrnent of a high institute of
theology - In such an institute, Islamic studies are taught however
the studies seek to unveil the weaknesses of Islam and point out sup-
posed rnistakes in the Qur'an and Hadith. An example of such an insti-
tution is STT Apostolos College.
8. Christianization by publishing Christian books in the semblance of Is-
Iamic publications - This method seeks to deceive Muslims who have
little understanding of Islam so that they are tricked into reading Chris-
tian material and eventually accepting Christianity.
9. christianizationby imitating Musiims 
- 
christians dress in Muslim cloth-
ing, such as kopiah, sarung and kerudung, and spread doubt in Islam
throughout the Muslim community. Such an approach, according to
Sabili, occurs in a number of places in Indonesia especially in the Be-
tawi community in Kampung Sawah, Jakarla.
l0.christians also utilize free alternative recovery Qtengobatan alternative
gratis), VCD, TV and Radio, magic, hypnotism, and even spirits (as
has been reporled West Sumatra and Jakarta) to convert Muslims.raT
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Sabili claims that the Christians are essentially attempting to obliterate
the existence oflslam in Indonesia, or at least prevent it from playing any
role in public life. Prominent proof of this is the case of the Jakarta Char-
ter. Christian groups refused to accept the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter
in the 1945 constitution which includes seven words "with the obligation
of the adherents of Islam to carry out shari'ah" even though it has fully
been agreed to by the Board of Investigating Efforls for the Preparation of
Independence (BPUPKI). They threatened to separate East Indonesia from
the rest of Indonesia if the proposal was carried out. After lobbying Hatta,
the seven words were removed. In more recent times, the Persatuan Pem-
bangunanparty (PPP) and the Bulan BintangParty (PBB) suggested incor-
porating the Jakarta Charler in the 1945 constitution, but once again the
Christian groups rejected it.ra8
Another example of Christians' efforts to oppose Islam taking a place
in public life is when the House of Representatives was in the process of
legalizing the regulation of the national education system (RUU Sisdik-
nas).rae The Christian groups demonstrated in the streets insisting that the
representatives vote against passing the regulation. They argued that the
section on religious education does not appreciate pluralisrn. Although their
demands were supported by the Indonesian democratic Party-Struggle
(PDI-P) fraction, which was dominated by Christians, the regulation was
passed.l50
Sabili's strong hostility towards Christians made it evidently biased in
reporting the communal conflict that took place in Ambon, Maluku from
1999 to 2000. In many of its reports on the conflict, Sabili failed to pro-
vide coverage ofboth sides, one ofthe ethical codes ofpress. The analy-
sis made by political observers as weil as the media was that source of the
conflict was the contest for economic resources and the increasingly dis-
proportionate distribution of political power between Muslim migrants and
the indigenous Christians.r5r In Sabili, however, there was a tendency to
see the religious conflict as the ideological clash between Islam and Chris-
tianity. Christians were in fact described as rioters who brutally attacked
and slaughtered Muslims, while Muslims were presented as victims forced
to defend themselves with inferior traditional weaponry such as stones
and swords.l52 America and Israel were believed to have supported Chris-
tian groups in Maluku with weapons. Siding with the Muslims, Sabilicalled
on Muslims to go for y/rad to help their brothers against the kuffar (inft-
dels) in Maluku.
With regards to the Jews, Sabili calls on all Muslims to boycott Zionist
and American products following the fatwa of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi
that buying their products is haram since their money contributes to the
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killing of Muslim Palestinians.r53 In presenting a negative image of the
Jews, Sabli refers to the following verses of the Qur'an:r5a
1 . Jews are fond of breaking agreements and changing the facts (al-Baqatah:
100, a|-Baqarah:89, al-Anf&l: 56, and an-Nisti::155).
2. Jews tend to engage in slander and deception with the aim of raising
doubts about Islam (AIi Imran:72, and aL-Maidah:49-50).
3. Jews usually make false allegations and collaborate with the infidel
(kafi r) (an-N isd:S 1 - 52).
4. God forbids Muslims to take the Jews and Christians as guardians and
to trust their intentions (al-Mumtahanah: 13, aL-Maidah:51-56, and al-
Baqarah:120).
5. The Prophet was strict in dealing with the tricks and slander of the Jew
(al-Ahzab:21).
According to Nurasyid, the Christians' and Jews' strategy of destroy-
ing Islarn has changed into the so-called ghazwul fikri (war of thought)- k
is intended to raise doubts about Islarn and bring Muslims away from
Islamic guidance. In general the four S's - that is songs, sports, sex and
study - destroy Islam.155 Moreover, generations of Muslims are also being
destroyed by drugs.156
3 ) Opposition to America
Opposition to the West 
- 
in particular America - has been a common
theme in Sabili. Besides a special section entitled 'Alam Islamy'(Islamic
world), which deals with the tragedies that afflict the Muslim world, Sabrlr
reports cases that show the role America plays in creating instability and
conflict in Muslim countries including Indonesia.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, America became the lone su-
perpower, and thus has appointed itself as the world police which has the
right to intelene in other countries affairs, especially in Muslim countries. To
Sabili,the political policies used by America are influenced by Samuel Hun-
tington who views Islam as the greatest enemy of America.r5T According to
the editor Nurdi. America wants to dominate the world tkough gold, glory
and gospel and Islam is seen as a potential threat to achieving this goal. There-
fore America utilizes whatever methods it can to hinder the implementation of
formal shari'ahand destroy militant Muslim movements in the Muslim world
as well as to colonize rich Muslim countries for their own interests.rss
The invasion by US troops and its allies of Iraq was heavily criticized
and condemned by Sabili. During the invasion and the war, Sabili actively
reporled the latest developments in the war. As an advocate for Muslims,
Sablt described the battle in Iraq as a Jihad against the enemy of Islarn and
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regularly repofted the cruelty of US troops in killing Iraqi civilians and
children, bombing their houses, and treating Iraqi prisoners like animals.
Sabili furthermore reinforced the fact that America lied about the exist-
ence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.r5e The invasion of Iraq, in
Sabili's view, is actually rnotivated by the interest to seize control of the oil
resources in Iraq in consideration of their own dwindling oil supplies.
Instead of bringing freedom and democracy, the magazine contends, Amer-
ica and its allies have only brought suffering to the Iraqi people'160
As part of its efforls to destroy Islam, America has alleged that a number
of Islamic individuals and groups are in fact tenorists.16r This allegation initial-
ly found momentum in the wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on
September ll'h 2001. As a direct implication of this attack, America began to
link the al-Qaeda network with Islamic tnovements and figures in Asia espe-
cially Indonesia. The bombings in Bali, the Mariot Hotel, McDonalds, and the
Australian Embassy have brought America's war on terrorism to Indonesi4
witl'r the country being labelled a haven for temorist activities. As a result,
many Muslim activists such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir have been anested and
j ailed without sufficient evidence.
Sabili responds to such claims by the United States by describing the
borrbings and terrorist issue as an American conspiracy to destroy Islam
around the world. Anis Matta, the general secretary of PKS, as quoted by
Salman, states that America is seeking to eradicate and destroy Islam by
eliminating Islamic movements.r62 That is because America is concerned
that if such movernents are not contained, they will become a threat to US
domination and interests in Asia.r63
Other rnethods have been employed by Arnerica to destroy Islam- Re-
ferring to the New York Times, Sabili reported that the Pentagon has
prepared special steps to achieve this goal. First, the United States will try
to reduce the function of the Mosque as the centre of Muslim movements.
Second, it will influence the religious education curriculum in countries
around the world, especially in countries where Muslims represent the
majority. Last, the Pentagon will finance educational institutions that favour
or adopt western model of education.r6a
In light of this, the writers of Sabili often question and suspect the Ford
Foundation and Asia Foundation (TAF) of being the puppets of the US admin-
istration who are being used to weaken Islam by supporling ceftain Muslirn
groups, such as the liberals, and rejecting others. TAF in parlicular has sup-
porled liberal Muslims who actively push such issues as gender equity, plural-
ism, human rights and democracy in Indonesia. TAF has furlher been giving
financial aidto syir'ahmagazine,one of the leading liberal magazines in Indo-
nesia.r65
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